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IEEE 802.21a 2012

$52.00

IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Media Independent Handover Services – Amendment for Security Extensions to Media Independent Handover Services and Protocol

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
IEEE 2012 92
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Amendment Standard – Active. Amendment to IEEE Std 802.21-2008. Extensions to IEEE Std 802.21-2008 are provided for security mechanisms to protect media independent handover services and mechanisms to use MIH to assist proactive authentication to reduce the latency due to media access authentication and key establishment with the target network. The PDF of this standard is available at no charge compliments of the IEEEGET802 program located at http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/support.html

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
1 IEEE Std 802.21a™-2012(Amendment toIEEE Std 802.21™-2008), front cover
3 Title page
6 Notice to users
Laws and regulations
Copyrights
Updating of IEEE documents
Errata
7 Patents
8 Participants
10 Introduction
11 Contents
15 IMPORTANT NOTICE
16 1. Overview
1.3 General
2. Normative references
17 3. Definitions
19 4. Abbreviations and acronyms
5. General architecture
5.1 Introduction
5.1.9 Proactive authentication and key establishment
20 6. MIH service
6.2 Service management
6.2.1 General
6.2.2 Service management primitives
6.5 Media independent event service
6.5.4 Information elements
21 7. Service access point (SAP) and primitives
7.4 MIH_SAP primitives
7.4.1 MIH_Capability_Discover
7.4.1.1 MIH_Capability_Discover.request
7.4.1.1.2 Semantics of service primitives
7.4.1.2 MIH_Capability_Discover.indication
7.4.1.2.2 Semantics of service primitive
22 7.4.1.3 MIH_Capability_Discover.response
7.4.1.3.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.1.4 MIH_Capability_Discover.confirm
7.4.1.4.2 Semantics of service primitive
23 7.4.17 MIH_Net_HO_Candidate_Query
7.4.17.2 MIH_Net_HO_Candidate_Query.request
7.4.17.2.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.17.3 MIH_Net_HO_Candidate_Query.indication
7.4.17.3.2 Semantics of service primitive
24 7.4.17.4 MIH_Net_HO_Candidate_Query.response
7.4.17.4.1 Function
7.4.17.4.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.17.5 MIH_Net_HO_Candidate_Query.confirm
7.4.17.5.2 Semantics of service primitive
25 7.4.18 MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query
7.4.18.1 MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query.request
7.4.18.1.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.18.2 MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query.indication
7.4.18.2.2 Semantics of service primitive
26 7.4.18.3 MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query.response
7.4.18.3.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.18.4 MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query.confirm
7.4.18.4.2 Semantics of service primitive
27 7.4.27 MIH_Push_Key
7.4.27.1 MIH_Push_key.request
7.4.27.1.1 Function
7.4.27.1.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.27.1.3 When generated
7.4.27.1.4 Effect on receipt
7.4.27.2 MIH_Push_key.indication
7.4.27.2.1 Function
28 7.4.27.2.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.27.2.3 When generated
7.4.27.2.4 Effect on receipt
7.4.27.3 MIH_Push_key.response
7.4.27.3.1 Function
7.4.27.3.2 Semantics of service primitive
29 7.4.27.3.3 When generated
7.4.27.3.4 Effect on receipt
7.4.27.4 MIH_Push_Key.confirm
7.4.27.4.1 Function
7.4.27.4.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.27.4.3 When generated
7.4.27.4.4 Effect on receipt
7.4.28 MIH_LL_Auth
7.4.28.1 MIH_LL_Auth.request
7.4.28.1.1 Function
30 7.4.28.1.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.28.1.3 When generated
7.4.28.1.4 Effect on receipt
7.4.28.2 MIH_LL_Auth.indication
7.4.28.2.1 Function
7.4.28.2.2 Semantics of service primitive
31 7.4.28.2.3 When generated
7.4.28.2.4 Effect on receipt
7.4.28.3 MIH_LL_Auth.response
7.4.28.3.1 Function
7.4.28.3.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.28.3.3 When generated
7.4.28.3.4 Effect on receipt
7.4.28.4 MIH_LL_Auth.confirm
7.4.28.4.1 Function
32 7.4.28.4.2 Semantics of service primitive
7.4.28.4.3 When generated
7.4.28.4.4 Effect on receipt
33 8. Media independent handover protocol
8.4 MIH protocol frame format
8.4.1 General frame format
34 8.4.1a Protected MIH protocol frame format
8.4.1a.1 MIH PDU protected by (D)TLS
35 8.4.1a.2 MIH PDU protected through EAP-generated MIH SA
8.4.1a.3 Protected MIH PDU upon transport address change
36 8.4.2 Fragmentation and reassembly
8.4.2.1 General
37 8.4.2.2 Fragmentation
8.4.2.3 Reassembly
38 8.6 MIH protocol messages
8.6.1 MIH messages for service management
8.6.1.1 MIH_Capability_Discover request
8.6.1.2 MIH_Capability_Discover response
39 8.6.1.11 MIH_Auth indication
8.6.1.12 MIH_Auth request
40 8.6.1.13 MIH_Auth response
8.6.1.14 MIH_Termination_Auth request
41 8.6.1.15 MIH_Termination_Auth response
8.6.1.16 MIH_Push_key request
8.6.1.17 MIH_Push_key response
8.6.1.18 MIH_LL_Auth request
42 8.6.1.19 MIH_LL_Auth response
8.6.3 MIH messages for command service
8.6.3.7 MIH_Net_HO_Candidate_Query request
43 8.6.3.8 MIH_Net_HO_Candidate_Query response
8.6.3.9 MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query request
44 8.6.3.10 MIH_MN_HO_Candidate_Query response
45 9. MIH protocol protection
9.1 Protection established through MIH (D)TLS
9.2 Key establishment through an MIH service access authentication
46 9.2.1 MIH service access authentication
52 9.2.2 Key derivation and key hierarchy
54 9.2.3 EAP-generated MIH security association
55 9.2.4 Termination
9.3 MIH message protection mechanisms for EAP-generated SAs
9.3.1 MIH_Auth message protection
56 9.3.2 MIH PDU protection procedure
57 9.3.3 MIH PDU protection by AES-CCM
58 9.3.3.1 AES-CCM Parameters
9.3.3.2 Construct AES-CCM Nonce
9.3.3.3 Operational procedures in AES-CCM
9.3.3.3.1 Encapsulation
59 9.3.3.3.2 Decapsulation
9.3.3.4 Format of security TLV
60 9.3.4 MIH PDU protection by AES in CBC mode and HMAC-SHA1-96
9.3.4.1 Initialization vector for AES in CBC mode
9.3.4.2 Operational procedures in applying AES CBC and HMAC-SHA1-96
9.3.4.2.1 Encapsulation
9.3.4.2.2 Decapsulation
61 9.3.4.3 Format of security TLV
9.3.5 MIH PDU protection by HMAC-SHA1-96
9.3.5.1 MIC generation and verification
9.3.5.1.1 MIC generation
9.3.5.1.2 MIC verification
9.3.5.2 Format of security TLV
62 9.3.6 MIH PDU protection by AES-CMAC
9.3.6.1 MIC generation and verification
9.3.6.1.1 MIC generation
9.3.6.1.2 MIC verification
9.3.6.2 Format of security TLV
63 9.4 Common procedures
9.4.1 Sending
9.4.2 Receiving
64 10. Proactive authentication
10.1 Media specific proactive authentication
65 10.1.1 Procedures in a media specific proactive authentication
10.1.1.1 PoS and candidate media specific authenticator discovery
10.1.1.2 Proactive authentication through EAP or ERP
10.1.1.3 Media specific association handshake
10.1.2 Proactive authentication message format
10.2 Bundling media access authentication with MIH service access authentication
10.2.1 Media specific key derivation
10.2.1.1 Derivation of media specific root key (MSRK)
66 10.2.1.2 Derivation of media specific pairwise master keys (MSPMKs)
67 10.2.2 Media specific key distribution
10.2.2.1 Push key distribution
10.2.2.2 Reactive pull key distribution
10.2.2.3 Optimized proactive pull key distribution
69 Annex A (informative) Bibliography
70 Annex D (normative) Mapping MIH messages to reference points
71 Annex F (normative) Data type definition
74 Annex G (normative) Information element identifiers
75 Annex H (normative) MIIS basic schema
77 Annex J (informative) IEEE 802.21 MIB
79 Annex K (informative) Example MIH message fragmentation
82 Annex L (normative) MIH protocol message code assignment
83 Annex M (normative ) Protocol implementation conformance statement (PICS) proforma
85 Annex N (informative) Authentication and key distribution procedures
91 Annex O (informative) Protection through transport protocol
IEEE 802.21a 2012
$52.00